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ACTA SCIENTIAE CIRCUMSTANTIAE
1999ꡡ19 1 Vol.19No.1 1999



ڶ˺Բ˼ŻͶʷ÷̯*
ӱܡ
ժҪȾи۵λƽ̯ŻͶʷõıҪԣӦöԲ۽ŻͶʷ÷̯Ŀ.ŻͶʷ÷̯˺Բģ͵Ľⷽ(ShapleyֵķCGAMCRS)Ӧһ.ָӦöԲŻͶʷ÷̯нƹ滮˳ʵʩЧؿȾƻʹõԳչ.
ؼʡƣŻͶʷ÷̯Բۣ˺Բģ.
Optimal treatment cost allocation based on multiple-person cooperation game in total emission control
CHEN Wenying
(Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084
HOU Dun 
(Urban Water Resources Center, Ministry of Construction, Beijing 100007
AbstractThe necessity of allocating the optimal treatment cost fairly and reasonably among each polluter in total emission control is analyzed and the possibility of applying game theory to the issue of the optimal treatment cost allocation is discussed in this paper.Then the multiple-person cooperation game model of the optimal treatment cost allocation and the solution approaches including the method based on Shapley value, core method, CGA method, MCRS method and so on are delineated. These methods were applied into a case study. It is concluded that application of game theory in the optimal treatment cost allocation is helpful to implement emission control planning schemes effectively.
Keywordstotal emission control, optimal treatment cost allocation, game theory, multiple-person cooperation game model.
ɳչΪ෢չսԳΪȫĹʶǶȾչơƻʵ־óչĸ֤.ƹ滮ΪȵȻĿǰƹ滮ƣҪĿǰĹ滮ֻעŻҪЧߣ֮ͬҪĹƽ.Ҫݸ۵λԻӰĴСƽط̯ŻͶܷãӶʵֹƽЧʵͳһԱ֤ƹ滮˳ʵʩ1.ӦöԲ۽һŻͶʷ÷̯
1ӦöԲ۴ŻͶʷ÷̯ĿԷ 
Բоֳͻѧ.Բվ(ԲߵĲμ)ɷΪ˶ԲߺͶ˶Բ.1944Von NeumannMorgensternдԲ뾭Ϊ2ݵĳ־ŶԲ۵γ.ԲNash3ݡLuce4ݵ˵оеõ˲ϵķչ.Thmas5ָԲߺͶԲ۵ǰ˹ģԲȻܽеĳͻ⣬ȴʼջ㼯ŷͻõļ.
ȾУ۵λͨʹ㻷ĿʱͶܷ(ŻͶʷܺY)Сڸ۵λӦȾ(ݸȾλԻӰĴСƽȷ)ʱͶܷ(ӦͶʷܺX)۵λͶʷ÷̯ʵҲηɺ(X-Y).ÿ۵λϣԽԽã̯ͶʷԽԽ.˸۵λη桢η̯þʹųͻ.
ŻͶʷ÷̯ʵʹ֮ӦöԲ.˺Բߵ˼÷̯ϵǽ÷̯оӦ÷һ¶6.
2ŻͶʷ÷̯˺Բģ͵Ľ
ĳһ۵λķ̯ͶʷôӦͶʷãһ۵λķ÷̯.һķ÷̯㣺
(1)
УZk,XkֱΪ۵λkķ̯ͶʷúӦͶʷãKʾ۵λγɵļ.һɳΪ.

ͬʱ۵λķ̯Ͷʷ֮ӦŻͶʷ(Yk)֮C(K)
(2)
ʽ(2)Ϊ.ڴȾƹ滮УԹ滮ģͽŻʱC(K)̿ɱʾΪ
(3)
(4)
ʽУFi()ȾԴiͶʷúQ0iȾԴiĳʼŷQi(Q*i)ȾԴi(Ż)fijȾԴiԿƵjĴݺCsjƵjĻĿֵNȾԴMƵ.
⣬ڶ˺Բлһɳ֮Ϊ˺ѧʽ£(5)
ʽУSĳЩ۵λγɵļϣЩ۵λͨʹǵͶʷܺΪСSɳΪˣSSе۵λC(S)۵λγSʱŻͶʷܺ.
ڴȾƹ滮УԹ滮ģͽŻʱ̿ɱʾΪ
(6)

(7)
ʽУISSе۵λȾԴγɵļ.
    ʽ(5)ǺģĳЩ۵λķ̯ͶʷܺʹγSŻͶʷܺͣôЩ۵λ뵽K.
ɴ˱ɵõŻͶʷ÷̯Ķ˺Բģͣ
(8)
3ŻͶʷ÷̯˺Բģ͵
ŻͶʷ÷̯˺Բģ(8)ⷽ1УShapleyֵķCGAMCRS.
3.1Shapleyֵ
ShapleyֵŻͶʷ÷̯ļ㹫ʽΪ
(9)
ʽУC(S-{k})ʾ۵λkӦȾS-1۵λŻʱͶܷ.
3.2ķ
ŻͶʷ÷̯˺Բģ͵ĽɵļϳΪ˺Բߵĺ(Core)пǿռ.ķǸ˺Բģе˺һɳ۱.Դ˿ɽΪĳЩ˵ĺڴKĳ̶ֳϿǡ̫áģΪʹ۵λڴKнܺеS(1SK)ŻͶʷܺͼһ.Ըɳ۱Ϊ˱֤ÿ۵λķ̯ͶʷòӦͶʷ.Ȼܼɳ۱.
ոS(1SK)ŻͶʷܺC(S)ӶķĲͬķɷΪС(Least Core)С(Weak Least Core)ͱС(Proportional Least Core).
СķУS(1SK)ŻͶʷܺͶһͬĶ.۵λķ̯ͶʷþͱԹ滮⣺
(10)
Թ滮м⣬ʹһֳΪ(tiebreaking)7ݵķ.Z=(Z1,Z2,,ZK)SSĳΪ
(11)
e1(Z)ΪZйصκ˵󳬳e2(Z)Ϊڶ󳬳e3(Z)Ϊ󳬳ȵ.СZʹe1(Z)ΪСļZ1,Z2ΪZ1еZʹe2(Z)ΪСļϣZ3ΪZ2еZʹe3(Z)ΪСļϡ̲ϽȥɵõֻһZ*ļZn.Z*ΪԲߵĺʣɴ˱õΨһķ÷̯.
СķУǸS(1SK)еÿһ۵λһͬĶ.Թ滮Ϊ
(12)
Թ滮ж⣬ͬСķһķõԲߵĺ(յķ÷̯)ͬSĳΪ
(13)
ڱСķУͨS(1SK)һŻͶʷܺͳɱĶ.ӦԹ滮ɱΪ
(14)
Թ滮ķǶSĳe(Z)Ϊ
(15)
ȻͬСķͬķõʣӶ˸۵λķ̯Ͷʷ.
3.3CGA
CGA(Cost Gap Allocation)УؼĸһǱ߼ʷãǷȱڣ8.ȾŻͶʷ÷̯ԲУÿһȾλkı߼ʷΪ
(16)
߼ʷmckʾ۵λk뵽KӦеķ(С̯).
ÿһSķȱڶΪ(17)

۵λɰʽ̯Ͷʷã
(18)
:
(19)
3.4MCRS
MCRS(Minimum Costs-Remaining Savings)CGAƣMCRS̯ͶʷõıʽΪ
(20)
ף9ݸ˼ZkmaxZkminķµԹ滮⣺
(21)
ͨ2KԼͬԹ滮ſɵõZkmaxZkmin(kK).
ף1ָZkmaxZkminԷֱʽֱӼõ(22)
(23)
۵λı߼ʷúӦͶʷ÷ֱΪͺߵķ̯Ͷʷ.ĴȻǺģҿԼټ.ʽ(20)(22)(23)Ͷʷ÷̯ķɳΪ򻯵MCRS.
4
4۵λĵӦȾͶʷ÷ֱΪ50Ԫ200Ԫ130Ԫ90Ԫ滮(3)ɵø۵λŻͶʷ÷ֱΪ0230Ԫ90Ԫ60Ԫ.4۵λγ24-2-4=10S(1S4)滮(6)ʽ(7)ɵøֿܵ˵ŻͶܷã(λΪԪ)
{1,2}=230 {1,3}=165 {1,4}=125 {2,3}=280 {2,4}=235
{3,4}=200{1,2,3}=320{1,2,4}=275{1,3,4}=245{2,3,4}=350.
ֻڶ˺öԲ˼ŻͶʷ÷̯ļڱ1У漰Ĺ滮ⶼGAMS.
1ŻͶʷ÷̯ļ
Table 1 Calculation results of the various optimal treatment cost allocation methods
ŻͶʷ÷̯ŻͶʷ÷̯
ShapleyֵZ*=[38.8,161.2111.2,68.8]T
СķZ*=[40,150114,76]T
СķZ*=[41.2,146.3,116.3,76.2]T
СķZ*=[43.3,144.3,115.4,77.0]T
CGAZ*=[41.1,149.8,116.1,73.0]T
MCRSZ*=[38.7,152.4,115.9,73.0]T
򻯵MCRSZ*=[37.1,158.2,113.9,70.8]T
5ıȽѡ
ӱ1Կַļ˵ЩһԺͺ.òͬķȷķ÷̯ȫͬ˸۵λϣݶķз÷̯.ʱ԰۵λԸַ޳ɱԵķ.30%۵λ޳Shapleyֵķ䷽Z,70%۵λ޳ɱСķķ䷽Z壬ɲµԷΪյķ÷̯Z*:
6
ڶ˺Բ˼ŻͶʷ÷̯ݸ۵λԻӰĴСƽؽŻͶܷ÷̯۵λȱ֤ƹ滮Чֲʧƽȷƹ滮˳ʵʩЧؿȾƻʹõԳչ.
* ԭһֿƼչĿ
ߵλӱ廪ѧܼоԺ100084
          ܡ貿ˮԴģ100007
ο
[1]ӱ.Ⱦƹ滮ܾ֧ϵͳ۲ʿѧλģ.廪ѧ1996
[2]Von Neumann, Morgenstern O. Theory of games and economic behavior. Prinston: Prinston University Press,1944
[3]Nash J F. Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 1953,21(1):129140
[4]Luce R D, Raiffa H. Games and decision. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957
[5]Thmas L C. Games theory and applications. Ellis: Horwood Limited, 1984
[6] ±.÷̯Ⱥ߷.ϵͳʵ199010(5)3036
[7]Young H P et al. Cost allocation in water resources development. Water Resources Research, 1982, 18(3):463475
[8]]Tijs S N, Driessen T S H. Game theory and cost allocation problems. Management Science, 1986,32(8):10151028
[9]Heaney J P et al. Methods for apportioning the cost of a water resource project. Water Resources Research, 1982,18(3):476482
1997-04-04յԭ塡1997-09-04յ޸ĸ
