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    ׷Դ˹1937Ѿˡг֯׵ĳɱҵ֯׵ĳɱбȽϡ۶ϣġҵıʡһɴ˳
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ҵǩ˳ںԼִйĹԱ˵Ҫ͵öࡱĹ۵㡣峣ڽһչ˹˹ףҵ֯
Ҫؽ׵ĺԼгǲƷ׵ĺԼҵгԼ걸̶ȵ𡱣֮ķѷ19791978
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ʵ֤ѧΪΪٶʵԲҪ۵ĳЧֻҪָĶfriedman,1953 Ҳ
һѧҷ粼ǿΪҪԾعעΪĶBridgeman,1995,p.45 ܽ˹
ƶȰŰɡ׷ԴĻ״̬˶̵о뵽ˡJenkins,1980,p.5
ָڿ˹õ˾ִƶȾѧӦоˣʵƶȵԼжˣִƶȾѧǹ
ѧCocas,1984,p.231
    һ˵ѧ֮ԵоҪӽǣһ֪ѧӽǣ˵֪cognitive competenceз
ޣ̽˵ˮƽ  һΪmotivationalassumptionӽǣǷ׷̶ȵ
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жѡʱӵе֪ϵͳΪṩ˹ʵģͣж߻ȡϢʹʼģ͵õ
֪֪ǳƴΪԣ        perfectrationality򹤾ԣinstrumental rationality ӵ
ԵΪˡ
    ԣˡٶԽѧегģ൱ûǹõģµ˹Ը
ҵ߿ЧúƶǸģӦԼǰޡ²³µ棨contingent claimsƾ
ķͻΪһһݵּۻ   Villiamsom,1984,p.45еļʼͳͳӲ
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    ȻִͳΪٶžѧȥĳЩʮֻ⣬Ϊڶ£ѡʱȡϢǲģ
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󡪡֯ƶƶȱǨΪˣԼˡˣԼΪܴﵽ֪޵ģ˵нģһ
ͼء޳̶ϵˣSimon,1961
    󲿷ֵԶн벻ԡԵĻнеġͼ˵ľ壨ҲƳɱСԣ
ԲδֻʷȻѡ񡱵ġлԡorganic rationalityĳ̶ȣAlchian,1950 ŵ˼ġ·
ҲɱŬĿܣⲻԼ˵ԡнǿһֲּܶԵˮƽġ
н硱ҪڲˡڽУǱ׼ͱΪܳ׼ȷ뽻йصδԣԼÿ״̬Լ
Ȩεľ걸Լάӭ1996ˡԼţڶδÿһܷ״̬ºԼ˫
ȫصõԾûʣȨ⡣Grossman and Hart,1984,p.7 ϢԳԶɵĽ׳ɱ
Լʵʩǰõţû֯⣬ֻм⣬ģáΧáԣֻ롰ԼˡԺ󣬷гĸ
֯г֯õ㷺ĽͣԼ˫ΰЧǵͳĽ㡣Ӧ˵н
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    ׷ɵķǿ̶ȡ¹ŵġˡһϵsimple self-interestԼ
һǿٶΪ˶С塱ıԡ
    صôɵµĻ˵ǡʵؼȶϷõĲᳬǵ֧ṵ̂
ۣҲһ˵Peter diamond,1971,p.31 ԴĽгϵͳЧģּ򵥵Ͳ
Ϊʼ״̬ͨԵĽȫء̹׵ʾģǳԼҲʹԼδֵܳ״̬st
ate of  the worldõȫȷĶ壬 ӶԼض renewalеκλ嶼޳ɱصõ𡱣Langlois,1984,
p.44ʹ˫ʵԼ֮涨档һص׷ڱ֤˫ǰصõʵ֣Ҳ׻˵
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Ϊͨǰex ante Ļ弯۱ҵѡϣǸձָЩڲԳϢ£ʵ
Ԥı󵼡ϢʾﵽռͰжWilliamson,1985,p.177ɴʹί˴ڼ֮У
ʹõٲˡͥ൱ֵºex post ԼʵʩԤ⣬֯ϳֵġ
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Ԥ¼һµõԼͬ˫󻯵жԼԼִгɱȡö
»һµõ⣺̹ͬ׵ʾйصϢӶԼִн׶γֺ˫󻯵ж
1986,p.48ʵϣºΪΥһ˵棬ͲлȵĳŵºĻûгֵ
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棬ҪǶԼ־ϵĻרϵģĳ׷ӣûκº׳ɱƶȶ˵Ҫʱ
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ǲòǵнԺͲδ򹲲½Ļ屾ԡ
            
    Ϊ˽һ⡰ԼˡΪʽȱ˽ʵеԼ
    ӸϽԼĳڷֹ뽻һἯвͬ˴²ͬĹ֣ǷֹͨͬʵļĲ
ƷתƾǽסֵͬҪͨķʽǵĲƷͨױֹ֤ļ׽ִ
ƷƲֻеڽôֻǡģСֹ򵥡̬пھȨϵάֳáMacneil,1989,p.1
0֮ӷġ̬̬ضҪԶڽӶͷųо˵Ǳ棬淴ܽһٽ
ֹרҵԶڵĴδʵĽҪԼŵʽҪʲô߲ʲôԱ֤˫
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УΪбǰߡ׳ɱº֣֮ȳɱݡ̸ҪıЭ̣ҪԡǱ׼Լ
ģʹĴҪԼֹ֮˽Ϣϰ˫ܹȷδκ״̬µ棬
걸ļƣƣôԼйذŶǰּۻ۽׶εõͲԼº׳ɱǡ
ˡ磬Կһܵļƻ磨a world of planning
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ostsԼıϳɱbonding costsԼ˵ǶԸЩɱһ֯磨a world of governance
    ĸMichael jensenWilliam MecklingĴɱг룬޳ķѷһ۵㣬׳ɱӼϽ
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     еԼڼϿԷֳɶ֣һǷԽ׵Լdiscrete transactionsһԽ׵Լrelationaltr
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зʣνġһֽǮһֽʽġԼͶġsharp in by clear agreement,sh
arp out by clear performance"Macneil,1989,p.15ĶԷԽ׵ĸཻУƷͬʵġ׼ģг
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ЧضƻΪΪԲҪΪʵʩ׶Ŭ۸ΪʹʵֵЧṹ
ԵĽףгףһ硣
    ƷǷǱ׼ԵģгǾԵģҲ˵ʲרԵģٲгԼ
    ʲרԣAsset Specificity һ׷ݵЪ׼ۡеĴͶʵʾһֳɱǱ
׼൱ͶʵԤ;ĲרԵĳ̶Ǹ߻ǵͣͿʲ²ʲֵʧĴСֳֵĴ
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רԡⷽонȨʵֵ֤ǽ˹ˣPaul   L.JoskowĹú뷢糧ĳںԼĸ˵ܼ򵥷糧
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ʱרͶʵһѷʧרͶ˵һ־޴ƺͰԣרԵͶҪһֶıʩһ
ʵĿԼ ƱصͶʲ㣨undervalueԴԶʲ㣻ʹޱгṹ
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ȶ
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    ʲרĶԶҪº׳ɱɺܴһ2510ϵĺԼԼˡļٶ£ǲ
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     Խ׳ɱһҪάȡ  ȷ  uncertainty
    Ү˵Ĺ۵ǡ֯еһȤⶼ벻ȷйأ֯ҪһӦʱ䡢ص֮ضı仯
Hayek,1945,p.524ȷԲֻ򵥵ڸأķѷҪ⽻׳ɱѧĹؼҪΪȷ
ԵҪԡ
    ԭȵвоȷߣ       TjallingKoopmansϸֲȷԣһǹδ״̬ĳ
ȷԣprimary uncertaintyǡȻƫõĲԤı仯ɡڶǡȱͨ¾޷
˽ԷӦľƻΪμȷԣsecondaryuncertaintyȻۿֲȷԶû漰Ϊȷ
Ļ⣬һԲ޹Ϊʽ
    ķѷǿڶԲԵڸǡŤϢ˵ȱϢʶṩ󵼵źţˣĲȷ
ʵһ⣬ǰĲȷǣºȷǽڻʵĲȷԳ֮ΪΪȷԣ
¼ĸΪȷԲʣΪԵǶԵ⣨Ludwig Mises,1949,p.112пܣ
Եأǰ־Ļ򣬴Ӷ˭˭ڻķֲиСĻʣȻֳΪˡķ²
ķѷǿĽ׳ɱѧ۵һشŵ˼ָġһˣһǳרҵͶ
÷˼ʽļУǲҪظĹϵҲ˽һֻҪǽдӰ˼ʹϵظΪѡ
񵽷˼ʹϵĲظ׵ѡ񣬹ڽĲȷԾͻӡԵԽأԽȷõ
ϢҲǵģԽһĽ1990,p. 30ˣʹ޷ֲǵľ
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     Ϥѧʷ ᷢ֡Լˡĳֿ׷Լ30ʱѾӿֳһоѧѧ֯۵ѧߣ
ǴӸԲͬĽǶעͬһ⣺׳ɱӽ׳ɱΪ¹ŵһ޴սȻЩ˼ʼû
ѧоգ෴ȴ˽30꣬ⲢżȻʱľѧѧ֯۵оɹǶ޹صġԽ
۹˵ʱѧҵҰ൱խ뱣صġǴδԹߵоͳһһֿѧƣinterdispline
Ӿ뾭ѧ谭෨ѧ֯ѧ˼ھѧе׳⣬ʱ׳ɱѧ˵ĿɲԶԶ޷
ռͳελ¹ŵȣֻһСľ֡ˣʱĺܶ˼ڽǼ߶Ĵպ׳ɱ
ѧҪ
    ھѧ϶֯ش׵أFrank KnightھRisk,Uncertainty and Profit1992Ԥ
ΪҪȥ˼롱ڱо֪౾ԡھеҪԣرָ
·աǾ֯еһԱ˼ѧķѷպĽ׾ѧҪӰ졣ѧ統ʱص۸
עĹڡ벻ȷԡļ𡣲ԭ·աʱǽ۱⣬
ڵʱѾ൱Ƶļ塣صʱһǼԵĴʻ㣬硰塱ӹ㷺ձᡢ뾭֯
Ĵʻ㣬»΢Ĳͬ
    һλԾֻ֯ƶѧСȦڵõϵǿâ˹John R.Commonsâ˹Ǿ÷
Ļλ1934,pp.4-8ó׽ʮ΢۲ϵķâ˹һֻ֯Ǽķӳģá
Χõ뼼ԡǳЭ˫ʵǱڵͻCommons.1934,p.6֯Ĺͨ
رṹٽ˫Խ׹ϵֵ֧гԼϵ⵽ƻһ˼ѾΪڵƶȾѧ
ܡ
    ˹Ronald Coase1937ԱȽƶȵķо֯һ㽫гʵЭĻֶΣ˹
ҵܹʵʩͬĹܣ˹ҵĽһǿҵгֿľ֯1952,p.333׾
ҵʽ֯ҵͨгУͳΪһıȡڽеĳɱ硰ˡΪ
ġ
     ѧожԽ׳ɱѧشӰģKarl Llewellyn1931ġWhat Price Contractһ
ʱʢеԼжԷɾĽţˡԷ򡱣iron rules롰Է򡱣yielding rules𡣡
ԼҪǶÿһ͵֯ÿָ˻֮ʱùϵṩһܣһ޷ʵйϵȷֻ
һִָʾġŸ߶ȿɵԵĿܡһִżȻָʾһڽ໥ϵʱйߵĹ淶׼1931
,pp.736-737һ۵뿵â˹̵֯ķıϡԭھѧ뷨ѧеġͥر֤Լʵʩԡ
ٶԾѧҵæڷֹоѧҵæǿԼ걸ʹ⵽սĵĹײɵ͹

    ŵԼclassical contract law֮ͼǿ׵гԣԣͽ߾ܡṩйʱص㷽
ıʹֱԵõĲʵ֡Macneil,1978,p.863ν걸ԱӳѧϾԼ
һ棬Լ˫޹ؽҪģܷϾѧгĽԣΣЭӱ˫֮
䶨磬Թŵ䷨ʽԶڷʽΪȴʩ׼ȷع涨ԵĽǲġ
˵ŵԼصǡġʽļͿʵʩԼһַƣơ
    ÿһֽ׶ڹŵԼģرǲȷµĳԼν걸ıǲܣǽ綨ɱˡ
ȣеδ״̬ڳʼ̬ʱԤ⵽Σ״̬֣µΪǲܵģᵽĻ
δ״̬ı仯ûģԣӲԼĻᵼ˳֡ΪˣɵĽ۱ֵṹ
ãϸơΪкܶٽָķٲ˵ǿеģԷͥо˵ǲ̫еġLon Fuller,1963,pp.11-
12һٲͨⷽ潻׵רңͥܡ Բ֤ͣд֤˶ѯ൱ؼԵרҵ⣬Ӷʹ۽
Գαʹ˫ܹǵشĹ̡¹ŵԼneoclassical contract lawص㣬һֽ
    ҪάִԽ׵ѹһЩԼţ繫˾ͼɽͿʼŵ䷨¹ŵ䷨ˡ
صǸǿԼеϵ͸ԣǿҪһ¹ŵ¸רŵ͵Լе顣
ͬһһϵ׼ŵ΢ᡱMacneil,1978,p.901¹ŵԼȣԵԼִевȫҪ
ԭʼЭ漰ṩʱ䷢չؽ̵ĺԼšȡڽ׵ԡרó̶Լгķ
֮ҵ˶»᣻ǿʼСǡгһС
            
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    50ޣ²³һʹ¹ŵ۴ﵽ˹ܺ߶˹Ժ۷壬һ桰ˡʵʱԽԽ
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    ʱֵѾԴġִ塱Ĵ뷴˼֮УһоԵĹԵԡԵĵ¡ԵȨ
ʼɶԵĹȡԵԡԵĵ¡ԵȨǡԼˡĻԼٶWilliamson,Alchian,  Klein
Щ˶ͬʱкѧܳΪһȺھѧ̨ϹעĿ޸ݵġйƸĸȻٻһ
о׳ɱȨѧߡ
    ⣬׳ɱѧеһͷʹ⡰ɲԡڵʱѾһģͣthe master mouldHayekĹ۵㣬 ʲ
ôʱĳһҪöĳ׼ձϿɣͱڳЩԵʱһϵģͿɹʹ
Լǣܳڽ׳ɱѧҪѧϵķģͣʹñȽƶȵоʽʵ֤ΪԼЧ峣
Ϊ˹Ľ׳ɱ۱绤Ϊܹ׵ĲͬԼڲͬα仯ģô׳ɱһɶ
ֵʹ׳ɱѧĶֻķѷý׳ɱĽͳֱеĳɱȽԺ
ŬпܽһGrossmanHartЩеõչΪҪойĸͱȰ⽲͸ѹ˵ףⷽ
ķķѷʱľƶȡ
    һ仰ڵľѧԽԽԼĿѧѡĿѧˣˣ뱻ٲˣͼ
Լͻ֯ʽ棬Ŀ겻ڽеĳͻȳǱڵĳͻӦṹֹ
ͻ1975,p.229˻൱ȫ׼ȷظ˽׳ɱѧľ
    ķѷڡԼˡ뽻׳ɱۿԺеƶ֯ķΪԼֻһ֣
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ķ֮ڡһ㽻׷õУƶȵʽ̸ӰֵЧʣľгģͰһǿ
ƶȽʹԼ˫ȡʵԵϢʹڸ߰Ľ׳ɱƶһᱻЧĽҡΪھüЧв
öڱԡNorth,1990,p.21⣻ һ׷õʵУһԼˡУû
ΪƶȾһζЧʣʵϺܶʱΪ˴ٽ˽ḣģ˵ƶȺΪЧ
ġȷʵƶȾõȺʽɷҾƶȱǨķ򡱣North,1990,p.56
    ˵ϢǲԳƵģϢԳƵ޷֤ʵģԼкܶĶǺ֤ʵģʱĽ
ɱܴ󡣰ķѷۣ¿ɻٲãʵʩԼǲеģ һڶfir
st party or second partyһȨʱ뽻׺Ȩ߾ͻڶԼȵĿǣ谭ƶḣĿ
֮˽ĿꡣʱʹϢǶԳƵģǨĿȷģҲǿ֤ʵģҲȨƣΪ
Ĳƶȵʽ̸ǿƶȰƶȱǨͻᳯǵķǨûӦֶֹⲿֽ
׳ɱ׼۸ضܸߣƶȴĸ뽩֡
    йľѧҶܵΪϵͳġˡѵΪǻδӴһ⣬һֻʽʹ̵ġʵ
塱̬ȣ ȻⲢһܺõġߡproblem solver ȴԳΪһϵġ
ߡ͡ߡ̸ƶȾѧ̸Լˡ̸֯뷨ɶԾѧӰ죬̹ʵ˵йľѧолǿ
סйʷᷢûʱһ£Ҳûжķһڣй̷ǲֵģϺͼ̾Ψû
СʦһС1907䲼ִɣܿڻزˣ˷ϵϮձͳ̨
ķɻֱ1986ǰ䲼񷨣ûȨĸڲȨԼЩҪг÷չ봴µԪ
һȫµġİȻŷȨгõѾž÷չйؽ׳ɱԼš֯
ƶȵȸĿ飬ĸĳɹھѧǿԽ綨ΪЧʵĲȨúͽʵʩȡС׳ɱ
Ȱŵĳɹ롰ԼˡѾ֮ˣ׼ȷؽڵʶʱˡ
α༭ٲ
οס
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    2.Cheung,Steven,1983,"The Contractual Nature of the Firm",Journal of Law and Economics,26
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