ѧ
JOURNAL OF SOFTWARE
1999 10 12  Vol.10 No.12 1999



Kailar߼ȱ
ܵ͡˹չ
ժҪЭ𽥳Ϊȵ.׷ָЭʹ˻֯ԼڵӽеΪ.ȱ׷,ӽ.ˣRajashekar KailarһڷЭп׷Եʽ,Kailar߼.ָһ߼ȱݣ1ܷЭĹƽԣ(2) ЭĽͼʼǷʽģھ;(3) ޷.
ؼʡ׷ԣЭ飬Э.
ͼšTP309
Limitations of Kailar Logic
ZHOU Dian-cui QING Si-han ZHOU Zhan-fei
(Institute of Software The Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100080)
(Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology The Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100080)
Abstract There is a growing interest in the design and development of electronic commerce protocols. Accountability is the ability to hold individuals or organizations accountable for transactions. Without such assurances, electronic transactions can be susceptible to disputes. Rajashekar Kailar has proposed a framework for the analysis of communication protocols which require accountability. The authors call this framework Kailar logic. In this paper, the authors find this framework has three limitations. Firstly, the framework cannot analyze fairness of protocols. Secondly, articulating initial state assumptions is an informal and error-prone step. At last, the messages with encrypted contents in the protocol cannot be interpreted.
Key wordsAccountability, electronic commerce, protocol, protocol analysis.
ż缼ķչ,ҵԽԽݴϢ.Զ(Internet)Ͻ,оǽеݱ.޴гӦǰʹһЩļ˾ͽڻΪһҪо⣬ڴȡȵλ.Զʹ̼ӵиûȺͬʱҲʹԶҵױøΪ㡢ݣӶ͹Ч.ܵӦǰʮˣǶԵİȫȴձĴ.ѧΪİȫṩЧıϣ뼼дڵİȫǵоٵҪ.
ʵҵ׻УǳƱ֤(ͬƱ)гֵ;.Ʊ֤Ĳαʹý׵˫޷ԼڽеΪӶΪеľṩһЧ;.ͬأΪӽ׹ĵЭҲ߱һƣܹΪ˫ṩ㹻֤ݣԱڲʱٲûЩ֤ףЭƱ׷ԭ.
ʵĽ׻ͬڵӽдϢױα죬޷Ʊ֤.ǩʹõӽײױα죬ǿ֤Դ.ڵЭеӦý˵ӽдϢױα.
ǣһȫǿȽϸߵ㷨ܱ֤׷ԵҪ󣬵ЭǷѭ׷ԭ򲻽İȫǿȣЭṹеϵ.
֤ͨЭоǿԷ֣ЭһЩ΢СĶᵼЭİȫ©ͬʱֺѲЩȫ©.ڴˣɷͨϸʽ֤ЭİȫԳΪоؽһ.
1989꣬Burrowsˣ1һֻ߼ʽڷ֤Эİȫ.˺оԱַ˴ĸĽ䣬γνBAN(Michael Burrows,Martin AbadiRoger Needham)߼.ôǷԽ߼֤ЭĿ׷أ֤ͨЭ͵ЭıȽϣKailar2ָ˴֪BAN߼ڷЭĸԭڣ߼Ҫ֤ĳĳһʽ׷ԵĿĳҪ֤һĳʽ.ΪˣKailarµ߼ڷЭĿ׷.
طKailar߼ȱݼӦõľ.ҲΪǸĽЭʽṩһЩ. 
1 Kailar߼
ڽKailar߼2֮ǰоٱõĻ.
A,B,...Эĸ.
mϢһ巢͸һϢ.
TTPε(trusted third party,TTP).
KaAĹԿ֤Aǩ.K-1aKaӦA˽Կ.
kỰԿ.
KabABĹԿ.
Kailar߼Ĺʽ£
A CanProve xκBAִһϵвʹͨЩԺAʹBŹʽxй©κy(yx)B.
Ka Authenticates AKa֤Aǩ.
x in mxmеһ򼸸ɱĺЭȷ.ɱͨĻӵԿļ.
A Says xAʽxxԼxƵĹʽ.ͨؼ۳,

A Receives m SignedWith K-1AյһK-1ǩϢm.ͨؼ۳,

A IsTrustedOn xAԹʽxйϽȨAЭAĹʽxȷ.
.
ӣ

Aܹ֤ʽxAܹ֤ʽyôAܹ֤ʽxy.
:

Aܹ֤ʽxɹʽxƵʽy(ʽx̺йʽyĺ壬ôAܹ֤ʽy.
ǩ:

Aյһ˽ԿK-1ǩϢmmаAĹʽxAܹ֤ԿK֤BǩôA֤B˹ʽx.
Σ

Aܹ֤BxйϽȨB˹ʽxôA֤ʽx.
Kailar߼Э鹲4裺
(1) оЭҪﵽĿ.
(2) Энͣʹ֮תΪ߼ʽ.һУֻЩǩϢҺͷ׷صн.
(3) оٷЭʱҪõĳʼ.
(4) Эз.
2 Kailar߼ȱ
ڽͨʵ˵Kailar߼дڵȱ.
2.1 ڹԿƵIBSЭ
׷ԭҪЭΪЭĸֵ֤Խֵܳľ.Эİȫ׷ǲģӦѭƽԭ.׷ԽҪЭɺ󣬸ӵгֵ֤.Э쳣ֹʱ״̬δӿ.ƽԭҪЭ쳣ֹʱλͬûκ崦λ.
ڴ˽УǽIBSЭ(internet billing service protocol)˵ȱƽ©.IBSЭ3ɿڻ-÷¡ѧĵЭ飬ЭΪ3.
ȷ۸
(1) ES:{Price Request}K-1e
(2) SE:{Price}K-1s
ȷ۸ĹУûEṩSһ˽ԿK-1eǩļ۸ѯϢ.ṩSͬ۸ͷһ˽ԿK-1sǩļ۸ͬϢ.
ṩ
(3) ES:{{Price}K-1sPrice}K-1e
(4) SInvoice:{{Price}K-1ePrice}K-1e
(5) SE:{Service}K-1e
(6) ES:{Service Acknowledge}K-1e
(7) SInvoice:{{Service Acknowledge}K-1e}K-1s
ṩЭУ1ϢûEṩSһ󣬷ṩSϢƵƱϣһǩķϢûE.ûEյ,һǩķϿϢṩSṩSƵƱ.
ݷƱ
(8) ES:{Invoice Request}K-1e
(9) SB:{{Invoice}Kb}K-1s
(10) BS:{{Invoice}Ks}K-1b
(11) BE:{{Invoice}Ke}K-1b
ڴݷƱЭУûEṩSһƱ.ṩSлBһлĹԿ,Ȼ˽ԿǩķƱ.֤Ʊ󣬽ӦתʴƱǵĹԿܺл˽ԿǩȻֱ͸ûͷṩ.
Kailar߼֤IBSЭȷ۸ṩ׶׷ԭ2.ǣIBSЭ鲻㹫ƽԭ.
IBSЭУṩSڵڣ5ΪûEṩ.ЭƣûEյڵڣ6ṩṩһǩȷϢ.ûEǲʵģյṩȷϢЭֹ.ʱṩ޷ṩûEṩ֤ݣûEѻ˷λ.
2.2 CMP1ЭCMP2Э
߼ƣKailar߼ԲЭĸгʼ.Kailar߼УһǷʽģ׳.棬ǽͨCMP1Эķ˵ʽĳʼ輫׳ӶЭʧ.
CMP1CMP2ЭRobert DengLi Gong֤ʼЭ4(certified electronic mail).ЩЭΪʼĴṩǷϷ.CMP1CMP2Э,CMP1ЭûṩE-mailݵļܱ.棬ǽͨCMP1ķ,ָKailar߼ڽ͹ڷʽȱ.
ȽCMP1Э.
(1) AB:h(m),{k}KTTP,{{m}K-1a}k
(2) BA:{h(m)}K-1b,{k}KTTP,{{m}K-1a}k
(3) TTPB:{{m}K-1a}K-1TTP
(4) TTPA:{{h(m)}K-1b,(B,m)}K-1TTP
kATTPĻỰԿ.
ڣ1AѡһỰԿkȻϢmժҪh(m)Ϣmǩkܵ{{m}K-1a}kͼܵĻỰԿ{k}KTTP͸B.ڣ2Bh(m)ǩͬתTTP.TTPյܻͨȡ{m}K-1aȻڵڣ3Լ˽Կǩ͸Bڵڣ4BǩժҪ(B,m)Լ˽Կǩ͸A.
Э.
ЭĿΪʼṩǷϷЭϣﵽĿ꣺
A CanProve (B Recieved m),(G1)
B CanProve (A Sent m).(G2)
ȣЭ£
(2.1) TTP Receives h(m) SignedWith K-1b,
(2.2) TTP Receives m SignedWith K-1a,
(3) B Receives (m SignedWith K-1a) SignedWith K-1TTP,
(4) A Receives (h(m)) SignedWith K-1b,(B,m)) SignedWith K-1TTP.
оٳʼ£
A1 A,B CanProve (KTTP Authenticates TTP),
A2 A,TTP CanProve (Kb Authenticates B),
A3 B,TTP CanProve (Ka Authenticates A),
A4 A,B CanProve (TTP IsTrustedOn (TTP Says)),
A5 (A Says m)(A sent m),
A6 (B Says h(m))(B received h(m)),
A7 (TTP Says (B,m))(TTP Says mɹ͸B),
A8 (B Received h(m))(mɹ͸B)(B received m).
£
Ϣ(3)ͼA1Ӧǩ,
B CanProve (TTP Says (m SignedWith K-1a)).
ݼA4BTTPι,
B CanProve (m SignedWith K-1a).
һǩ,
B CanProve (A Says m).
ʽüA5
B CanProve (A Sent m).(G2)
Ϣ(4)ȼ
(4.1) A Receives (h(m)) SignedWith K-1b) SignedWith K-1TTP,
(4.2) A Receives (B,m) SignedWith K-1TTP.
(4.1)ͼA1Ӧǩ,
A CanProve (TTP Says (h(m) SignedWith K-1b)).
ɼA4ι,
A CanProve (h(m) SignedWith K-1b).
ɼA2һǩ,
A CanProve (B Says h(m)).
ɼA6,
A CanProve (B Receives h(m)).(*)
(4.2)ͼA1Ӧǩ,
A CanProve (TTP Says (B,m)).
üA7,
A CanProve (mɹ͸B).(**)
ɹʽ(*)(**)Ӧӹ,
A CanProve ((B Receives h(m))(mɹ͸B)).
ĽӦüA8,
A CanProve (B Received m).(G1)
֤Э׷ԣЭߵĿ.
֤8ʼA1A8A1A4ǻģЭ߼ٶЭеǰ.A5A8Э֤Ϊ֤ЭĿ׷Զļ.A5A6A7ǶһЩƵмĽ.A8ʵЭ֤һΪ֤Bյh(m)ԼmѾʹBô֤B Received m.
Kailar߼ʽĹУ޷ʽķȷЭ֤֮ǰҪЩ.趼Э֤Ƶʱģ籾еA5A8.ҵǣǡЩᵼЭʧ.
磬ԱЭ޸ģΪCMP1(b)
(1) AB: h(m),{k}KTTP,{{m}K-1a}k,
(2.1) BA: {h(m)}K-1b,
(2.2) BTTP: {k}KTTP,{{m}K-1a}k,
(3) TTPB: {{m}K-1a}K-1TTP,
(4) TTPA: {(B,m)}K-1TTP.
ЭΪ
(2.1) A Receives (h(m) SignedWith K-1b),
(2.2) TTP Receives (m SignedWith K-1a),
(3) B Receives (m SignedWith K-1a) SignedWith K-1TTP,
(4) A Receives (B,m) SignedWith K-1TTP.
ʼԲЭCMP1A1A8£
Ϣ(3)ͬǰ֤
B CanProve (A Sent m).(G2)
Ϣ(2.1)ͼA2Ӧǩ,
A CanProve (B Says h(m)).
ɼA6,
A CanProve (B Receives h(m)).(*)
Ϣ(4)ͬǰ֤,
A CanProve (mɹ͸B).(**)
ý(*)(**)ԼA8ͬǰ֤,
A CanProve (B Received m).(G1)
ˣKailar߼֤ЭCMP1(b)Ŀ׷.ʵϣЭCMP1(b)ǲ׷.ٶͨ˫AǳʵģBǲʵ.Э(2.1)B͸A{h(m)}K-1bmǲͬmһϢ.ôЭִAõ{h(m)}K-1b{(B,m)}K-1TTPó㹻֤֤Bյmm.һԭڳʼA8.ʼA8CMP1гǻʵTTPյ{h(m)}K-1b{k}KTTP{{m}K-1a}k֮󣬼h(m)mһ.Bյh(m)ӦmA֤Bյm.CMP1(b)УB(2.1)Ƚ{h(m)}K-1b͸ATTP޷֤h(m)mһԣAֻ֤Bյh(m)޷֤Bյm.
2.3 ǷЭ(Zhou-Gollman)
Kailar߼УʽA CanProve xҪAB֤ʽxʱй©κy(yx)BʹKailar߼޷ЩǩģӶʹõķΧ.
ʵϣڱܵҪһЩЭϢܴܺ.ͬʱЩϢϢϴ󣬹ͨõԿ㷨м.Kailar߼壬Э岻ܹԿӶ޷֤ЩϢԴ.
棬ǲJ.ZhouD.GollmanƵǩӺͬЭ˵Kailar߼һ.ЭУJ.ZhouD.Gollmanһֻftpķ5ݣATTP:mʾAͨftp,TTPϢm.
ڣǽJ.ZhouD.GollmanƵЭ6.
(1) AB: {M}K,{{M}K}K-1a
(2) BA: {{M}K}K-1b
(3) ATTP: {K,{K}K-1a}Ka,TTP
(4) BTTP: K,{K}K-1TTP
(5) ATTP: {K}K-1TTP
Ka,ttpATTPԿ.
ڵ(1)(2)AѡһԿKMмܣȻͬ{M}kǩ͸B.B{M}kǩ󷵻ظA.ڣ3AԿKͬKǩTTPĹԿܺ͸TTP.ڣ45BͨftpTTPȡKTTPKǩ.AͨftpTTPTTPKǩ.
Э.
ЭĿΪ
A CanProve (B Says M),(G1)
B CanProve (A Says M).(G2)
Э£
(1) B Revieves (Encrypted M) SignedWith K-1a,
(2) A Revieves (Encrypted M) SignedWith K-1b,
(3) TTP Recieves K SignedWith K-1a,
(4) B Revieves K SignedWith K-1TTP,
(5) A Revieves K SignedWith K-1TTP.
оٳʼ£
A1A,B CanProve (KTTP Authenticates TTP),
A2A,TTP CanProve (Kb Authenticates B),
A3B,TTP CanProve (Ka Authenticates A),
A4A,B CanProve (TTP IsTrustedOn (TTP Says)).
(1)A3Ӧǩ,
B CanProve (A Says (Encrypted M)).
(4)A1Ӧǩ,
B CanProve (TTP Says K).
A4Ӧι,
B CanProve (K).
Ӧӹ,
B CanProve ((A Says (Encrypted M)(K)).
B޷й¶K֤AӦMĿ׷Ը.£KailarıܺǩȺ˳򣬼Э{{m}K}K-1aıĸıΪ{{m}K-1a}KıģӶõǩģԱʽ.ͨ۲Э飬ǿԷ֣ʹڵ(1)УA{{m}K}K-1aΪ{{m}K-1a}KBȻ޷ɱ{{m}K-1b}KǼǩǿɽ.ˣAܵõǩ{m}K-1b֤ʵBյ˱m.
һ棬ЭĻỰԿKʱɵģڵǰЭ鱨ĵļܣٲʱɳʾԿK.
3 
ǰ3ӵķΪKailar߼3ȱݣ
(1) ߼ֻܷЭĿ׷ԣܷЭĹƽ.Ҫȱ.
(2) ߼ڽЭʱֻܽЩǩϢʹ÷Χ.ˣKailar߼Ҫһ䣬ʹܽͺͷǩļϢ.
(3) Kailar߼֮ǰҪһЩʼ.ҵǣЩʼһʽḶ́ʼᵼЭʧ.ԣʽоٳʼͽЭҪ.
лĵоõȻѧĿΪ69673016.ڴ˱ʾл!
*оõȻѧ.
߼飺ܵͣ1971˶ʿҪоΪϢȫ.
˹1939оԱʿʦҪоΪϢȫۺͼ.
չɣ1969ʿҪоΪۣӦѧ.
ͨѶϵˣ˹100080йѧԺо
ߵλйѧԺо100080йѧԺϢȫоġ100080
ο
1Abadi M, Burrows M, Needham M. A logic of authentication. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 1990,8(1):1836
2Kailar R. Accountability in electronic commerce protocols. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 1996,22(5):313328
3O'Toole K R. The Internet billing server transaction protocol alternatives. INI TR 1994-1, Carnegie Mellon University: Information Networking Institute. 1994
4Deng R H, Gong L. Practical protocols for certified electronic mail. Journal of Network and Systems Management, 1996,4(3):279297
5Postel J, Reynolds J. File transfer protocol. RFC 959, 1985
6Zhou J, Gollman D. A fair non-repudiation protocol. In: Roscheisen M, Serban C eds. Proceeding of 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Oakland, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1996. 5561
1999-02-08յԭ,1999-05-25յ޸ĸ
